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  Almost from its inception as the European Economic Community, the European Union 
has excited the hope if not the expectation that it would generate dynamic gains from trade, 
including perhaps a permanent increase in the rates of growth of participating countries.  This 
paper examines the empirical evidence relating to this issue and then interprets the economic 
performance of the EU countries in terms of a simple theoretical model of economic integration 
with increasing returns to scale.  The paper concludes that evidence for increased long-run 
growth rates of the EU countries is weak, and that what may have happened instead is that 
countries have benefited asymmetrically from the formation and the later expansion of the EU.  
Benefits of economic integration appear to accrue – in the form of temporarily higher growth 
rates leading to higher levels of per capita income – first to large countries and then to some 
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I.  Introduction 
The exercise in economic integration that today is called the European Union 
(EU) began in the 1950s amid high hopes for the benefits that it would provide, both 
economically and politically.  The political benefits, by eliminating the historic military 
conflict among the participating countries, have been unambiguous and very large.  The 
economic benefits (in addition to avoidance of economic destruction caused by war) have 
also been fairly clear, but not so obviously large.  The static welfare gains from economic 
integration have always been estimated to be comparatively small, while the “dynamic 
gains” that many have hoped for have been both less well understood and difficult to 
identify in the data. 
Meanwhile, a distinctive characteristic of the EU
1 has gone largely unremarked in 
discussions of its effects on the participating countries:  the EU has expanded its list of 
member countries several times throughout its history, periodically adding new members 
                                                 
* We have benefited from guidance to the literature on European integration provided by David Greenaway 
and Alan Winters, as well as from comments by participants in seminars at Stockholm School of 
Economics, Stockholm University, and University of Copenhagen.  Alan Deardorff is grateful to Tore 
Browaldh's Research Foundation for financial support while working on this paper at the Institute for 
International Economic Studies, Stockholm University. 
1 For convenience we will call it the EU even for the years when it was called, first, the European 
Economic Community and then, from 1967 to 1992, the European Communities.  We will however use   2
and promising to continue to do so into the future.  This raises the question of whether 
EU expansion has had an effect on the participating countries distinct from their 
participation per se.  That is, can the effects of the EU on, say, the original six members 
be fully understood from just their participation in a customs union among themselves or 
even with a larger group of countries, or does a full understanding of these effects require 
that we take account of the fact that the EU was repeatedly expanding?  This seems 
particularly relevant for the issue of the effects of the EU on the growth of participating 
countries, which is our primary focus here.  Whatever may be the evidence and rationale 
for countries within a larger integrated trading bloc to grow permanently faster than 
nonmembers, one might expect an additional effect on GDP over time, and thus on 
growth in the intermediate run, if the trading bloc itself is expanding over time. 
In this paper we do two things.  First, we review the empirical evidence on the 
long-term growth effects of the EU.  As we will see, this evidence is not very strong, 
even though it has inevitably been collected from an era in which the EU was 
periodically expanding.  We then turn to the theory of how such expansion might affect 
the rates of growth that are observed to accompany the expansion.  Even a simple static 
model has implications for this, which we review.  But we find more interesting 
implications from models with increasing returns to scale, in which the dynamic path of 
EU expansion plays a role in determining which countries are able to attract increasing-
returns industries, and therefore in producing the resulting effects on per capita GDP.  We 
spell this out in the simplest possible model of trade with increasing returns, and then 
                                                                                                                                                 
EC-6 to denote the six countries that originally formed the EEC, EC-9 for the membership after the first 
expansion in 1973, and so forth.   3
sketch how the same results might arise in a more sophisticated model of economic 
geography. 
The conclusion that we, as the authors of this paper, have derived from our 
investigation is to seriously question the existence of the “dynamic effects” of EU 
integration as they have commonly been understood.  That is, we see little evidence for 
the belief that countries of the EU have realized a boost to their long-term rates of 
economic growth.  This is partly because of the likelihood of a different kind of dynamic 
effect, one that increases some members’ rates of growth, but only temporarily, during 
the process of expansion.  Thus, whatever evidence exists for a growth effect of the EU 
may include an effect of expansion that cannot, by definition, continue indefinitely.  
Since the evidence itself is minimal, this further weakens the case for the EU as a long-
run stimulus to growth. 
If this sounds like a negative message, we do not mean it to be.  We already noted 
the overwhelming success of the EU in securing political stability in a historically 
turbulent part of the world, and that by itself would be enough to justify its existence.  
We also see the economic benefits as being clearly positive and important, even though 
we doubt that they extend to the point of increasing long-run rates of economic growth.  
If countries want to secure permanently higher rates of growth, the means are more likely 
to be found in conventional tools of increased investment, especially investment in 
research and development and human capital accumulation, than in the quick fix of 
economic integration. 
   4
II.  Evidence 
We first look directly at the available data on income and growth in the EU 
member countries.  Then we review the empirical literature on how trade and integration 
in Europe may have affected these countries, especially in terms of growth. 
 
The Data 
Figures 1a-1o show the ratio of real GDP per capita to the average of all OECD 
countries for each EU member country over the period 1951-1997.
2  For each country, a 
vertical line shows the year in which it joined the EU, while a horizontal dashed line 
shows the ratio during the year before entry.
3  Relative to these two lines, benefits from 
joining are clearest if the graph passes from the lower left to the upper right quadrant.  
This is the case for Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy. It is also roughly true 
of Finland, Portugal, and Spain, although each of these three countries also enjoyed a few 
years of relative prosperity just before entry.  In contrast, the graphs pass into the lower 
right quadrant for Austria, Denmark, Greece, and the United Kingdom, each of which 
therefore only fell, relative to the OECD average, after entering.  The remaining three 
countries – Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden – show diverse behaviors, each of 
which is rather unlike the other countries.  Of course, for more than half of these 
countries the data include only a few years either before or after entry, so that these 
patterns are hardly conclusive. 
                                                 
2 Data are from the Penn World Tables, version 6.0, real per capita GDP, chain method, 1996 prices, except 
for Germany prior to 1991, for which the per capita GDP of West Germany is adapted from version 5.6.  
The OECD figure is the real-GDP-weighted average of the 22 countries included in the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee:  the OECD members as of 1990, but excluding Iceland and Turkey. 
3 For those countries that were members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) before their entry 
into the EU, we also include a vertical dashed line when they joined EFTA.   5
Based solely on inspection of these graphs, one certainly cannot say with any 
confidence that all countries have benefited economically from joining the EU.  On the 
other hand, it does appear that the majority of the members, especially those who joined 
it initially and have been in the longest, are enjoying higher per capita GDP, relative to 
the OECD average, than they did before joining. 
That, however, is not the same as a higher long-run rate of growth.  With the 
exception of Ireland, all of the countries that most clearly gained after joining also 
reached a peak some years later and then declined relative to the OECD average, 
indicating that at best their levels of GDP increased, but not their rates of growth.  Only 
three countries – Finland, Ireland, and Luxembourg – show distinct increases in the final 
years that could be the beginning of steeper growth paths, while two others – Portugal 
and Spain – reach higher levels a few years earlier that may augur well for their futures.  
But for the remaining countries, if EU membership has led to permanently higher growth 
rates, that fact is well disguised in these data. 
What does seem plausible from these graphs, however, is that the larger of the 
original six countries of the EU, may have gained substantially in the levels of GDP.  
France, Germany, and Italy all advanced steadily in per capita GDP relative to the OECD 
average during the two decades after the EU began as the European Economic 
Communities.  After that they leveled off and declined a bit, but the improvement during 
those two decades was substantial and lasting, something like 10, 20, or even 30 
percentage points.  Of course, these countries started this process while still recovering 
from World War II, and it may be that much of this improvement would have happened 
even without the EU.  Other countries’ performance during the same period was mixed,   6
with Austria showing similar improvement without membership in the EU, while the 
U.K. shows no such improvement at all, even after joining. 
Of the smaller original members, Belgium performed similarly to its larger 
neighbors, but its gain was smaller and somewhat delayed.  The Netherlands also gained 
a little, but then lost it completely.  Meanwhile, the smallest, Luxembourg, showed no 
sign at all of gaining from membership, and it might even have lost, until more than three 
decades after integration when it finally took off.   
 
Studies of the Growth Effects of European Integration 
There has been no shortage of studies of European integration.  Initially, and of 
necessity, such studies were prospective, using either extrapolation from the past or 
simple economic models to calculate what the effects of integration might be.
4  As time 
went on, the prospective studies became increasingly sophisticated in their use first of 
general equilibrium models and then their incorporation of imperfect competition,
5 and 
they also were supplemented by retrospective empirical analyses of the actual economic 
performance of the countries involved.  However, until the 1990s, almost all of the 
attention of these studies was on the effects of integration on trade, not on income or 
economic growth.  Perhaps influenced by the theoretical attention directed by Viner 
(1950) at trade creation and trade diversion, and perhaps simply looking at what was 
easiest to observe, the few retrospective studies sought to determine whether the EU (or 
its predecessors) had increased trade, and if so with whom.   
                                                 
4 See Balassa (1975). 
5 See Smith and Venables (1988).   7
Srinivasan et al. (1993) surveyed the empirical literature on the effects of 
regionalism (not just the EU) up to that time, and they identified only three retrospective 
empirical studies, all of which dealt only with effects on trade.  Although these trade 
effects are not our main interest in this paper, these studies show clearly and 
unsurprisingly that European integration caused a large expansion of the countries’ trade, 
especially with each other.  Viner (1950) had shown that not all such trade within a 
trading bloc is welfare improving, so this does not itself assure that the EU had increased 
incomes.  But the sense of this literature was also that trade creation had sufficiently 
exceeded trade diversion so that European integration had been beneficial, and most 
would agree that it had raised real incomes even if the increase had not been measured. 
Throughout this period, however, the effects that integration might have on 
incomes through expansion of trade, when viewed through the lens of simple and 
therefore static economic models, was presumed to be rather small.  Even when trade 
liberalization is nondiscriminatory and thus not trade-diverting, the gains from trade 
consist of the removal of the dead-weight losses due to distortion of producer and 
consumer behavior, and these tend to be relatively small.  For a large country that does 
not rely very heavily on trade, typical estimates of the gains from trade based on these 
models tend to be just a few percent of GDP. It was customary, therefore, to speak of 
unspecified “dynamic effects” that trade liberalization would also have, even though 
these were based more on hope than on analysis. 
Possibly the first effort to measure such dynamic effects was by Brada and 
Mendez (1988), who reported panel regression estimates for two equations with 
investment shares and growth rates as dependent variables and with dummy variables for   8
participation in six regional integration arrangements including the EU.  They found a 
significant positive effect on investment due to membership in the EU, but no such effect 
separately on the growth rate.
6  This study predated the theoretical literature on the 
dynamics of integration and growth, as well as the huge empirical literature of cross-
country growth regressions and the criticisms of that literature, many of which would 
undoubtedly apply to it. 
In the 1990s, both the theory and the empirics of dynamic effects took off.  This 
started with the theoretical contributions of Grossman and Helpman (1991), who built on 
the closed-economy, endogenous-growth models of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) to 
show several ways in which international trade could increase long-run rates of economic 
growth.  Also noteworthy is the work by Baldwin (1992), who sought to quantify the 
dynamic effects and to show that the prospective gains from the EU’s single market 
program (“Europe 1992”) would be a multiple of, and perhaps even an order of 
magnitude larger than, the static gains estimated in the Cecchini Report (1988). 
Empirical studies followed and are summarized in Table 1.  In addition to the 
country coverage and time span of the data, which may help to place the results in the 
context of the country behavior displayed in Figures 1a-1o, we also record how 
integration was captured: by dummy variables for membership in the EU or other trading 
arrangement; or by a variable based on amounts of trade.  For each study, we state what 
we see as the major conclusion as related to our issue of the effects of European 
economic integration on growth.  For those studies that found a significant effect and 
                                                 
6 The growth rate equation had capital accumulation as an explanatory variable, so this is consistent with 
EU membership stimulating the growth rate, but only through investment, not through improved 
technology.  Since the data for the study ended in 1977, this corresponds to the period of steady 
improvement in per capita GDP that we saw in Figures 1a-1o for the larger EU countries.   9
reported its size, we report the effect either on the rate of growth or on accumulated GDP 
over the time span of the data.  The details are as follows: 
•  Coe and Moghadam (1993) applied cointegration analysis to quarterly data on 
French output, 1971:1-1991:4, so as to identify long-run relationships between 
capital accumulation, growth, and trade integration measured by intra-EC trade as 
a percent of total EC output.  They found a clear beneficial effect of European 
integration on French growth.  However, they stressed that the relationship was 
between the level of integration and the level of output, and it did not imply that 
integration had a long-run impact on the rate of growth. 
•  Italianer (1994) regressed GDP growth on capital, labor, and trade-based proxies 
for integration among EC-6 and EC-12 countries for 1961-92.  He found 
significant positive effects of integration on growth, suggesting that growing trade 
had contributed to growing GDP.  During the period of estimation, integration 
contributed on average 0.3 percentage points to economic growth, which 
accumulates to an additional output of 10 percent by the end of the period. 
•  Landau (1995) took a slightly different approach to a larger sample of OECD 
country growth rates over the longer period, 1950-1990.  He used dummies for 
membership in the EU and added controls for time, initial per capita GDP, and 
others.  With one exception, the EU membership dummies were insignificant, the 
exception being a regression with no controls in which the dummy by itself had a 
significant positive coefficient and the dummy interacted with time had a 
significant negative coefficient.  This suggested a positive effect that may have 
existed in the early years but disappeared in the 1970s.   10
•  Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) also used dummies for EU membership, adding 
these both to the technology-spillover analysis of Coe and Helpman (1995), which 
we will discuss further below, and to their own previous analysis of determinants 
of investment.  They found a positive effect on technology spillovers, but nothing 
significant for investment. 
•  Henrekson et al. (1997) performed a variety of regressions on growth rates during 
1976-85 across a large sample of both developed and developing countries, and 
included a dummy for membership in the EU or EFTA.  They found a significant, 
positive effect that became smaller, but retained its significance, when the sample 
was restricted to developed OECD countries.  The effect was as valid for 
membership in EFTA as in the EU, and it seemed to arise from technology, not 
investment. 
•  Vamvakidis (1999) sought to avoid the pitfalls of cross-country growth 
regressions by using fixed effects in a time series of five-year average growth 
rates for all available countries over 1950-92.  In these he included dummies to 
indicate whether the countries participated in broad liberalization or in regional 
trade agreements.  Only the former appeared to have a significant positive effect 
on growth.  In Table 1 we therefore record as “not significant” the effect of the 
EU on growth, although of course the study did not look at EU integration 
separately from the many other regional trade agreements. 
•  Vanhoudt (1999) also used a time series, but tailored it specifically to the issue of 
EU membership by defining his time periods between EU expansions.  Within   11
that context, and in several specifications using various controls, the coefficient 
on EU membership was consistently insignificant. 
•  Johansson (2001) narrowed attention to just four large EU countries and 
examined growth in total factor productivity (TFP) in 22 manufacturing industries 
in each country.  Using imports from within the EU and imports from outside as 
explanatory variables, she found the former to be significant, while the latter was 
not, suggesting a positive effect of intra-EU trade on growth of TFP. 
One’s first impression from Table 1 may be that the results are very mixed, some 
studies finding effects of integration on growth while others look for such effects but fail 
to find them.  There is however one suggestion of a pattern in the results that might be 
worth noting:  All of the studies that fail to find an effect of integration on growth use 
dummy variables to measure integration, while most (but not all) of the studies that do 
find an effect use a trade-based measure of integration.  This could mean that the former 
studies simply use too crude a measure of integration, and we should believe the latter 
studies instead.  Or it could mean that the trade-based measures are subject to the 
criticisms that Levine and Renelt (1992) levied against growth regressions more 
generally.
7 
We are not prepared to sort out these issues definitively here.  We can only say 
that we remain unconvinced, based on the evidence we have seen, that European 
integration has increased the long-run growth rates of the countries involved.  We do not 
doubt the static benefits of European integration.  And we are prepared to believe that at 
least some of the EU member countries enjoyed increased rates of growth following   12
integration that lasted for a number of years, perhaps benefiting from the “medium term” 
growth effects that Baldwin (1992) extolled.  But if the EU has caused its member 
countries to advance to permanently higher rates of economic growth, we have a hard 
time seeing it. 
 
Other Evidence 
In addition to the studies mentioned in Table 1, there has been other empirical 
work that bears on the issue of how the EU may have affected growth in its member 
countries, even though these other studies did not address the question directly.  This 
includes, for example, the work of Ben-David (1993, 1996), who has shown a tendency 
for per capita incomes to “converge” as a result of economic integration and trade.  This 
means a fall over time in the dispersion of per capita incomes across countries, 
particularly those that trade a lot such as the original six members of the EU.  This result 
does not, of course, say anything about whether this convergence is achieved by the 
initially poorer countries growing faster or vice versa, and it therefore has no direct 
implications for the effects of integration on rates of growth.
8 
Another body of evidence that certainly deserves mention is the work on 
technology spillovers initiated by Coe and Helpman (1995).  They regressed changes in 
TFP on import-weighted averages of other countries’ expenditures on research and 
development (R&D) and found a significant positive effect.  They concluded that the 
fruits of R&D spill over to other countries through trade, suggesting therefore that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The main message of Levine and Renelt (1992) was that effects found in growth regressions were seldom 
robust to the inclusion of other control variables.  See also Frankel and Romer (1999), who stressed that 
causation may be expected to go both directions between trade and growth.   13
country’s growth can be stimulated by increasing its trade with other countries that are 
doing a lot of R&D.  Of course, this assumes that such trade does not adversely affect the 
country’s own level of R&D, which continues to be important, but it certainly provides a 
plausible case for integration among, and with, high-R&D countries in order to stimulate 
growth.  This, indeed, is one of the mechanisms developed theoretically by Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), and the Coe and Helpman results provide empirical support for it.  This 
is so compelling, in fact, that one has to wonder why the more direct search for growth 
effects of European integration, reviewed above, has not been more successful.
9 
Which brings us to the broader literature on the effects of trade on growth.  This 
extends back at least to the work of Michaely (1977) and includes contributions during 
the 1990s that are too numerous to list here.  The point for us is that, if indeed trade 
contributes to growth, as many believe in spite of the many criticisms of this literature, 
then doesn’t the fact that the EU has increased trade mean that it must also have increased 
growth?  Unfortunately, no.  In addition to the concerns that causation may run from 
growth to trade rather than the reverse, there is also the question of which, among the 
many causes of trade, may lead to trade that is beneficial for growth.   
The point can be made quite simply in terms of Frankel and Romer’s (1999) very 
clever demonstration that at least one sort of trade does indeed cause growth.  By using 
economic geography variables as instruments for trade, they avoid the endogeneity 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Nor does it imply that per capita incomes converge within countries, across internal regions and/or across 
other economic groups. 
9 The answer may be implicit in the paradoxical observation of Keller (1998), who showed that the Coe-
Helpman results did not require that the R&D levels be weighted by trade.  What Keller called random 
weights, as well as simple arithmetic averages, would work as well.  Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) argued 
that Keller’s weights were not really random, but were centered on arithmetic averages.  That is apparently 
true, but it leaves open the question of why these arithmetic averages work as well as import-weights.  
Until this is sorted out – and Keller does not provide an explanation, only the observation – it seems that 
there is still a mystery here.   14
problem of most trade and growth regressions and show conclusively that such trade as is 
caused by geographic factors, such as proximity and size, does indeed contribute to 
growth.  But does it follow that such trade as may be stimulated by economic integration 
will cause growth?  We don’t know.  For the trade that is caused by integration is 
inherently not the same trade that Frankel and Romer capture with their instruments.  
Until we know why the geography-based trade plays the role that it does in promoting 
growth, we have little basis for assuming that the same causation applies to trade that 
arises for other reasons, such as integration.  Indeed, we know from the theory of trade 
creation and diversion that not all trade is the same in its effects, so we should not assume 
that here. 
In short, we have a long way to go before empirical work will tell us all that we 
want to know about this issue. 
 
III.  Theory 
In this section we use economic theory to address the question of EU expansion.  
Our concern is not just with the effects of economic integration, especially regional or 
preferential integration, although that is certainly part of the story.  We are also 
concerned with the phenomenon of a growing trading bloc, one that, once formed among 
a few countries, repeatedly adds additional countries as the EU has done.  The question is 
whether this process of expansion has implications that differ at all from the original 
formation of the trading bloc. 
Traditional trade theory has not usually addressed this question, perhaps because 
it was not viewed as interesting.  In a static model of trade creation and diversion, each   15
new country added to a preferential arrangement causes the same kinds of things to 
happen, with new opportunities for trade creation and new ones also (unless the added 
country is that last outsider remaining) for trade diversion.  Of course, some trade 
diversion that had occurred in an earlier expansion may be reversed by a later one, so the 
likelihood of expansion being beneficial may improve.  But otherwise, further expansion 
of a trading bloc is just more of the same.  If trade creation dominates trade diversion 
when a bloc is first formed, then it is likely to continue to do so as the bloc is expanded, 
and the welfare of participating countries as a group ought to expand fairly smoothly as 
the bloc gets larger.  The gains may not be shared uniformly among them, however, as 
new members causes changes in relative prices within the bloc that benefit some 
members and harm others.
10  A new member that exports the same goods as an existing 
member will turn the terms of trade against that existing member. 
The issue of expanding trading blocs was addressed a few years ago in a paper by 
Krugman (1991b), and also a bit later by us, in Deardorff and Stern (1994).
11  The focus 
of these papers was not so much on the expansion of a single trading bloc, but rather the 
effect on the world as countries group together into preferential arrangements that in turn 
combine to become larger and, therefore, fewer.  Krugman used a monopolistic 
competition model of intra-industry trade in which the world is divided into some 
number, n, of trading blocs.  He simulated the effects of expanding the blocs and thus 
reducing n.  What he found was that world welfare first declines as blocs expand, 
reaching a minimum when there are just three blocs each comprising one third of the 
world.  Beyond that, as the number of blocs falls to two and then one (free trade), welfare 
                                                 
10 We are grateful to Helene McCarren for pointing this out. 
11 See also Baldwin (1996), Levy (1997), and Krishna (1998).   16
increases.  Deardorff and Stern (1994) used a model based on comparative advantage, in 
which larger trading blocs are more likely to include, and thus to take advantage of, 
countries with diverse abilities.  In their model, although a fall in welfare as blocs expand 
is possible, a lower bound on welfare rises monotonically with bloc size from autarky to 
free trade.  This suggests a likelihood, though not a certainty, that bloc expansion will be 
beneficial. 
All of these models treat countries symmetrically, so that whatever happens to the 
welfare of the group of countries in a trading bloc also is presumed to happen to each 
member.  Yet one of the messages of the data displayed in Figures 1a-1o is that the 
countries of the EU seem to have performed quite differently from one another, both 
comparing large and small members of the original EC-6 (such as France vs. 
Netherlands) and comparing the original members with countries of comparable size that 
entered later (such as France vs. U.K.).  To allow for such asymmetric performance 
across countries, either or both in terms of exogenous country characteristics or in terms 
of their positions in the resulting equilibrium, it seems useful to examine a model in 
which increasing returns plays a larger role.
12  Indeed, we have been motivated to do that 
by reading Puga and Venables (1997), in whose model increasing returns and related 
forces lead to agglomeration of industry in particular locations within a trading bloc, so 
that the benefits of integration are shared unequally.  We will return to their model a bit 
later, but first we explore the role that increasing returns can play in a much simpler 
model. 
                                                 
12 The model of Krugman (1991b), though it assumes increasing returns at the level of the firm in order to 
generate monopolistic competition, does not permit that feature to play much of a role in the resulting 
equilibrium.  As is common (but not universal) in such models, assumptions about preferences, technology,   17
 
Increasing Returns 
The model we use is a variation of Ethier (1982), which also appears in various 
forms in textbooks on international trade.  There are two sectors, both of which employ 
only labor.  One sector – call it wheat – has constant returns to scale; the other – call it 
manufactures – has increasing returns to scale that are external to firms but internal to the 
country.
13  Both sectors, therefore, can be perfectly competitive, even though for a given 
wage, average cost in the manufactures sector will decline with output. 
This model is routinely used to illustrate the effects of increasing returns on 
patterns of trade and the gains from trade, looking at a world of two countries that move 
from autarky to free trade.  For our purpose of examining expansion of a trading bloc, we 
will abstract from the realistic complications of trade subject to non-prohibitive barriers 
(and thus also from the possibility of trade diversion) and ask, in a world of many 
countries initially in autarky, identical except perhaps for size, what happens first when a 
group of them trade freely, and then when that group expands to include more countries.   
In Ethier’s (1982) model, costs of manufactures decline from infinite to zero as 
output expands from zero to infinite, giving rise to a greater multiplicity of equilibria than 
we care to confront here.  We therefore depart from his model slightly by assuming that 
average cost in manufactures is finite and declines with rising output less rapidly than 
does the price that consumers are willing to pay.  Multiple equilibria will still exist, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and number of firms lead to a constant output per firm, with industries expanding and contracting only 
through entry and exit of firms, not through changes in firm size. 
13 Ethier (1979) also explores the implications of internationally increasing returns, but these would not 
have anything like the implications that we are interested in here unless their effect declines with distance, 
as is true, in effect, in Puga and Venables (1997).   18
involving different patterns of specialization across countries, but the model with trade 
will be somewhat better behaved and more tractable. 
Consider first, then, the standard problem of two (out of many) countries opening 
from autarky to free trade.  Figure 2 shows the autarky equilibria.  The larger country, A, 
(with a larger labor force) has production possibilities given by the curve TATA'.  The 
smaller country, B, because it has the same technologies, has a transformation curve 
TBTB' that is the same as TATA' but shifted vertically downward.  In each country, autarky 
equilibrium requires that the price of manufactures equal its average cost and thus that, 
wherever production takes place along the interior of TT', the price line must extend from 
the wheat intercept of TT' to the production point.  That price line is then the budget line 
for aggregated consumers, who must in equilibrium choose to consume also at that same 
point.   
Thus the autarky equilibrium in country B is at EB with price line pB (its slope is 
minus the relative price of manufactures) tangent to the indifference curve uB.  The 
autarky equilibrium in the larger country, A, is at a point like EA, with autarky price pA.   
The main purpose of putting both countries in the same figure is to show that 
pA<pB; that is, the increasing-returns good, manufactures, is cheaper in autarky in the 
larger country.  This is shown by noting that, since TATA' is identical to TBTB' but 
vertically above it, it must cross a price line parallel to pB at point c, vertically above EB.  
But with homothetic preferences that are identical in the two countries, at that price 
consumption would be at point d, where the ratio of wheat and manufactures is the same 
as in country B.  The indifference curve through d also indicates that the market-clearing 
price at point c would be higher than pB, providing the incentive for output of   19
manufactures to increase.  Thus autarky equilibrium is found at a higher output of 
manufactures, and thus a lower average cost and price, as at EA. 
Now suppose that these two countries were to open to free international trade in 
goods but not labor.
14  Although several equilibria may actually exist, this price 
difference will under normal circumstances tell us where we go.  If initially outputs 
remain at their autarky levels, those outputs will be demanded at a single free-trade price 
that is somewhere between the autarky prices.  Higher than pA, it will provide the 
incentive for manufactures output to expand in the larger country, A; lower than pB, it will 
cause manufactures in the smaller country B to contract. 
Either or both countries may then completely specialize, though of course in 
different goods.  Which of several possibilities occurs depends on the relative demands 
for manufactures and wheat, each with rather different implications for the well being of 
the citizens of the two countries.  The role of demand is shown in Figure 3, in which one 
should first look at the supply curve, S, that exists within these two markets now that they 
are integrated.  Of necessity, this curve does not have the usual interpretation of 
describing quantity supplied at given prices.  Rather, it should be read vertically as the 
supply price corresponding to each quantity.  As such, it starts at point a, the price p
0 at 
which the smallest quantity of M would be produced in either country, which is equal to 
the slope of the transformation curves in Figure 2 at their vertical intercepts.  As output 
rises from zero in the larger country A (since that is the country that we know, from the 
autarky prices, will increase its production of M), the average cost falls due to increasing 
                                                 
14 It is true of course that the EU came to include the free movement of labor, not just goods.  However, 
even today, it is our understanding that labor is far less mobile even within European countries than would 
be needed for a unified labor market.  We therefore view the assumption of immobile labor – which is 
essential to our results – as more appropriate than perfect mobility.   20
returns and the supply price declines.  This only continues, however, until country A 
reaches its maximum output of M, MA
max.  At this point the price must rise again to p
0 in 
order to induce any output of M in country B.  From there the supply price again declines, 
this time reflecting average cost in country B, until it too reaches its maximum.  The 
supply curve therefore follows the crooked path, abcdeS. 
This supply curve can then be combined with whatever demand curve 
characterizes incomes and preferences in this trade-integrated market, three different 
examples of which appear in Figure 3.
15  If demand for M is not too large, such as the 
curve D1, then the whole market for M is served by the larger country, which also 
produces some wheat.  The smaller country specializes in wheat in this case, and the 
price of manufactures is determined by average cost in the large country.  For small shifts 
in the demand curve around D1, note that an increase in demand for M will lower its 
price.  If demand is larger, however, such as curve D2, then the large country produces 
only M while the small country produces only W.  The price now rises above average cost 
in country A, in order to clear the market, but fails to increase output since country A is 
already producing all it can.  And price is still too low, below p
0, to permit production of 
M to begin in country B.  Finally, for even larger demand, such as curve D3, the smaller 
country does produce some M, along with W, and price becomes the average cost of M in 
country B. 
                                                 
15 The demand curve is well defined, given first the incomes that consumers in both countries derive from 
the patterns of production reflected in the supply curve.  It is then the relative price of manufactures that 
will induce these aggregated consumers, given those incomes, to demand the indicated quantity of M and 
the corresponding quantity of W that the remaining labor will produce.  With identical homothetic 
preferences, there is no problem assuring that the demand curve is downward sloping.  It is likely, however, 
to have a slight kink at MA
max, although we do not attempt to show that.   21
Now suppose that another country, C, is added to this trading bloc.  What will 
happen depends on the autarky price in country C compared, not to the autarky prices of 
A and B, but rather to the price that prevailed with free trade between them.  In spite of 
the large size of their combined market, as we’ve seen, that price could be quite high, if 
demand was such that the smaller country was producing M and not too much of it, as at 
E3.  If so, the small country’s manufactures industry may be replaced by producers from 
country C.  Alternatively, it is just as possible that country C will have a higher autarky 
price than that in the trading bloc, and that it will be the one to reduce manufactures 
production. 
In this simple model, it is therefore difficult to say in what order the countries will 
enter the manufactures market, since the market price is so very sensitive to demand as 
shown in Figure 3.  Let us assume, however, that new entrants to the trading bloc 
typically have slightly higher costs of manufactures than do member countries, perhaps 
for reasons that are currently outside this model.
16  Then we can describe the process of 
bloc expansion in terms of a series of average cost curves, like Figure 3, but for multiple 
countries arranged in the order of their entry to the trading bloc.  This is shown in Figure 
4, where each average cost curve also has a short horizontal line crossing it at the level of 
its respective autarky price. 
Here the complete supply curve is composed of the average cost curves of six 
countries, A, B, …, F.  Demand curves are drawn for bloc sizes of 2 to 6:  A and B 
together yielding D2, A, B, and C together yielding D3, etc.  Thus as the trading bloc 
                                                 
16 For example, the increasing returns, which so far we have simply taken as given, may be the result of an 
externality among producers in close proximity or in the same market.  Then contrary to the model, that 
externality might spill across borders to some extent, reducing costs in other bloc members by a portion of   22
expands through the addition of more countries, the demand for manufactures within the 
bloc expands as well.  As drawn, the first expansion, adding the rather small country C, 
leaves patterns of specialization within the bloc unchanged and country A just increases 
output of M by a small amount, also reducing its price as cost falls.  The next expansion, 
to include the rather large country D, shifts demand to D4, causing country A to increase 
output of M to its maximum so that price rises.  Yet another expansion, adding country E, 
brings country B into production of manufactures as well as A and, as drawn, causes the 
price to fall again.  Finally, expansion of the bloc to include the last country, F, increases 
demand so much that even the smallest country C begins to produce manufactures.
17 
This, then, is part of the story that this simple model is able to tell about 
expansion of a trading bloc.  With an increasing-returns-to-scale sector, that sector will 
be pulled by integration into a single country until that country’s capacity for its 
production is exhausted.  With global free trade among many countries, one might expect 
that sector to expand in the largest country, whatever that may be.  But by forming a 
trading bloc, a group of countries may be able to direct that production instead into one of 
their own.  Then by expanding the bloc to include more countries and thus increasing the 
size of the internal market, they can induce that sector to grow beyond just one member 
country and into others. 
Does this do them any good?  The answer can be seen in Figures 5a and 5b, where 
the production possibilities for countries A and B are reproduced from Figure 2.  In each, 
                                                                                                                                                 
what it reduces costs at home.  This, in effect, is what happens in the economic geography model of Puga 
and Venables (1997) that we discuss below. 
17 Reaching this equilibrium, with C producing M and the much larger countries D and F not producing M, 
may be problematic, since autarky prices, shown for each country in Figure 4 by short horizontal lines, are 
likely to be lower than C’s.  It is here that we may need the sorts of cross-border externalities mentioned in 
the preceding footnote.  However, the situation with C producing M certainly is an equilibrium, since the 
price is below the cost, p
0, at which the other countries could begin production.   23
the equilibrium prices for each stage of bloc expansion from Figure 4 are drawn, 
anchored by the patterns of production in the two countries that are also indicated in 
Figure 4.  In the top panel, for example, price p2 reflects equilibrium in the two-country 
bloc of just A and B, and at this price country A produces both goods and exports M, 
reaching utility level u2.  When a third country, C, is added to the bloc, Figure 4 shows 
that price falls, to a level shown as p3 in Figure 5.  Country A expands its output of M and 
reaches a slightly higher utility, u3.  However, when the fourth country, D, is added to the 
bloc, then country A specializes in M and is also able to sell it for a higher price, p4.  This 
is where the country gets the biggest boost to its welfare, utility rising to u4.  From here 
on, further expansion of the bloc causes the price to rise and fall, changing country A’s 
utility in proportion to that price. 
Figure 5b shows the situation in country B, though omitting all indifference 
curves except u2 to reduce clutter.  Following the same prices as appeared in Figure 5a 
but recognizing the different specialization of country B, one observes that it gains 
slightly from the first expansion from 2 to 3, loses considerably from the second, from 3 
to 4, recovers somewhat with the addition of the fifth country, and then gains massively 
when expansion finally enables it to specialize completely in increasing-returns 
manufactures, at price p6.  Of course, it is not just the price that makes this possible, but 
the expansion of demand that occurred with the larger market, and the fact that country B 
was able to enter the manufacturing sector before other countries, D and F, that might 
have captured the market instead had they been part of the bloc from the start. 
Figure 6 plots the levels of welfare reached by each country as a function of the 
number of countries in the trading bloc.  Assuming that countries join the bloc at regular   24
intervals, the horizontal axes of these graphs represents time, and these are therefore 
roughly comparable to the graphs of per capita income over time that we saw in Figure 1.  
Notice that, like France, Germany, and Italy, the larger of our two initial countries, A, 
gains steadily for some time after the bloc is formed, leveling off after it includes several 
additional countries.  In contrast, the smaller of our countries, B, actually loses relative to 
autarky at one point after the bloc is formed, and only takes off to higher levels of welfare 
when the bloc is large, roughly like the performance of the smaller countries of the EC-6. 
This, of course, is just an example of what might happen.  Even with these same 
countries, other equilibria exist that might be reached if industries follow different paths 
of expansion and contraction.  And with other configurations of country sizes and orders 
of admission to the trading bloc, it is difficult to imagine any robust predictions that could 
be sustained.  But the example does draw attention to a few patterns that seem plausible 
and that resonate well with the data that we looked at earlier in the paper. 
1.  Large countries gain more than small countries from the initial formation of a 
trading bloc. 
2.  Small countries may gain more from the subsequent expansion of the trading bloc 
than they gained from its initial formation. 
3.  Other countries that enter a trading bloc late may find it difficult to exploit a 
comparative advantage in increasing-returns industries, and they may therefore 
gain less from membership than earlier entrants. 
4.  Growth of real income in a trading bloc, even that of the original members, may 
depend on the expansion of the bloc to include new members, thus expanding the   25
market size and allowing them to further exploit the scale economies in the 
industries where their early participation secured a foothold. 
Looking back at the data of Figures 1a-1o, it seems plausible to interpret the 
performance of France, Germany, and Italy as consistent with that of country A in our 
model.  The somewhat delayed success of Belgium might be an example of country B, 
while Luxembourg and Ireland may be examples of country C.  Meanwhile the U.K., in 
spite of its size, seems never to have gained much if at all from the EU.  In the context of 
the model, the U.K. may be like countries D or F that, in spite of their size, are put at a 
disadvantage by their late entry into the bloc. 
Obviously, all of this is making far more of a simple model than is justified, and 
we are only suggesting this model as a possible and very partial explanation of what the 
experiences of countries in the EU have been.  One lesson of this sort of model, in 
contrast to more traditional models with which we, at least, are more familiar and 
comfortable, is that the experiences of different countries may well be very diverse and 
complex, with effects that vary across countries in both their magnitude and their timing.  
It may therefore be expected that empirical efforts to relate performance to membership 
in a trading bloc will be fraught with difficulty. 
 
Geography Models 
Our use of the simple increasing-returns model above was motivated by what we 
have learned from the literature on New Economic Geography.  Starting with several 
papers by Krugman that built on his earlier work,
18 this literature stresses the forces that 
encourage and deter “agglomeration,” that is, the concentration of economic activity at a   26
single location, due to benefits that derive from being close to other economic activity.  
The application of such models to regional integration was done most elegantly by Puga 
and Venables (1997), who noted that regional trading blocs are likely to attract 
concentrations of increasing-returns industries into their member countries, attracted by 
their enlarged markets.
19 
Puga and Venables addressed primarily the differences between simple regional 
blocs and “hub and spoke” arrangements in which a single country makes separate free 
trade agreements with two or more other countries.  The former tends to center 
agglomeration within the larger member country, while the latter tends to attract it to the 
country at the hub.  Clearly, market size is all-important in these models. 
The geography models are far more complex than the simple increasing-returns 
model that we have used here, but they share several common characteristics, including 
this importance of market size.  Indeed, the Puga and Venables model produces very 
much the same patterns of specialization that we saw above as depending on the share in 
demand of the increasing-returns sector.  That is, when two countries integrate, in their 
model as well as ours, if demand for manufactures is relatively small, then the larger 
country will produce it along with the other good; if demand is somewhat larger, both 
countries will specialize; and if demand for manufactures is large, then the smaller 
country will produce both goods. 
The geography model goes beyond our simple model in at least two important 
ways.  First, it provides explicit underpinnings for the increasing returns that we simply 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 See Krugman (1991a, 1992). 
19 These models also incorporate imperfect competition, a feature that is required by their assumption of 
increasing returns to scale that are internal to the firm.  But imperfect competition does not seem to be 
otherwise important in generating their agglomeration effects.   27
assumed.  In geography models, increasing returns arises from a combination of fixed 
costs in producing individual varieties of manufactures, and from the cost reductions that 
arise when more varieties of manufactures become available.  The latter constitute an 
externality that produces a decreasing-cost industry within a country, but it also spills 
over, to some extent, across borders in a way that our simple model does not capture. 
A second difference is that geography models include an essential role for 
transportation costs.  If these are too high, then the forces of agglomeration are swamped 
by the need to produce close to geographically dispersed consumers.  On the other hand, 
since the increasing returns arise primarily through access to varieties, if transportation 
costs are too low then the forces of agglomeration are also diminished, since the relevant 
market becomes the world.  Only if transportation costs are of intermediate size does the 
model display its distinctive geographical properties. 
These differences are of course important, and they provide a much richer 
understanding of the geographic patterns of production and specialization than is possible 
with our simpler model.  However, although we have not succeeded in solving the Puga-
Venables model ourselves to verify this, we feel confident that it would yield much the 
same conclusions as our simple model if it were applied to the problem of trading bloc 
expansion. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have asked whether, and in what sense, European integration has 
contributed to the economic growth of the participating countries.  That is, have the 
traditional static gains from trade (assuming these even exist for this potentially trade-  28
diverting preferential arrangement) been augmented by “dynamic gains” that extended 
over time and produced larger benefits?  And in particular, since many have argued that 
this could happen, has the EU permitted its members to enjoy increases in their long-run 
rates of economic growth?  Finally, with or without such an increase, what is the pattern 
of these dynamic effects, both across countries (who gets them?) and across time (and 
when?)? 
We looked first at the data, then at the empirical literature that has attempted to 
answer the question of whether European integration has increased growth.  We then 
examined a simple theoretical model of increasing returns to see what it could tell us 
about which countries are likely to gain from integration, and when, during a process in 
which an economic bloc expands over time by adding more members.  Our main 
conclusions are as follows: 
1.  Based on the evidence, we are doubtful that European integration has 
produced increases in long-run growth rates. 
2.  What appears to have happened instead is that  
a.  the large countries among the original membership grew faster than 
other OECD countries for a period of years and then settled into new 
higher levels of per capita income; 
b.  the smaller original members gained little at first, but enjoyed similar 
movement to relatively higher levels of income some years later as the 
EU expanded to more countries; 
c.  countries that were added later to the EU trading bloc have had diverse 
experiences, some gaining (though also with a delay), others not.   29
3.  These patterns can be understood in the context of a model in which 
increasing returns to scale at the country level causes greater specialization 
and gains from trade in large members of a trading bloc than in small 
ones, and in early entrants than in late ones. 
If these conclusions are correct, then they have implications not only for the 
countries that are already members of the EU, but also for the countries that may join in 
the future.  To the extent that some current members have not yet been able to take 
advantage of the larger market by expanding into increasing-returns sectors, further 
expansion of the EU may provide that opportunity.  On the other hand, new entrants – 
especially small ones – may find that their gains from participation will be limited, at 
least at first, as they specialize instead in sectors that do not have the potential for such 
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Table 1 
Empirical Studies of the Effects of Economic Integration on Growth 
 
Study  Countries  Years  Integration 
Variable 
Conclusions for Europe 
 
Estimated Effect of 
European Integration on 
          Level of 
GDP (%) 
Growth Rate 
of GDP (%pts) 
Brada and Mendez 
(1988) 
Members of six 
integration schemes, 
including EEC 
1951-77  Dummies for 
membership 
Membership in EEC positively related 
to investment but not separately to 
growth. 
+0.48   
Coe and Moghadam 
(1993) 
France  1971-91  Intra-EC trade / 
output 
Level of European integration 
positively related to French output. 
  +0.7 
Italianer (1994)  EC-6  1961-92  Trade-based 
proxies 
Proxies for integration and openness 
have significant impact on growth. 
+10  +0.3 
Landau (1995)  17 OECD countries  1950-90  Dummies for EU 
membership 
No significant effect of integration on 
growth 
  Not significant 
Baldwin & Seghezza 
(1996) 
n.a.  n.a.  Dummy for EU 
membership 
EU membership has a positive effect 
on technology spillovers but not on 
investment. 
  n.a. 
Henrekson et al. 
(1997) 
All countries, also 
narrowed to OECD 
1976-85  Dummy for 
EC/EFTA 
EC and/or EFTA membership increase 
growth. 
  +0.6-0.8 
Vamvakidis (1999)  All countries  1950-92  Dummies for 
type of 
liberalization 
Dummies for broad liberalization are 
positive and significant, but not for 
regional liberalization. 
  Not significant 
Vanhoudt (1999)  23 OECD countries  1950-90  Dummies for EU 
membership 
EU membership did not have a 
significant effect on members’ growth. 
  Not significant 
Johansson (2001)  France, Germany, 
Italy, UK 
1973-90  Imports from EU 
vs. non-EU 
Industry TFP is positively related to 
intra-EU imports, not to imports from 
outside. 
  + 
 
 
 
 